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By letter ot ZS,tuLy'19b0"'ti," p.i.tdent oi 'thl'CoLne it of thd Eur@can
stci tne Eurbiein ptritidhent td: dbt'iver bn opinio'n on
the proposa[ f rom the Cotriliss.iol of th1'Eiiropgan C'ffinuhit'iee to the
Councit for a directive'ailcnding'UlreCtive"?fl1+A*te1*C on taxes other l
than turnover taxei r*rictr'affeif ftie 
te#snitiori:of nanufactured
tobacco.
on25AugustlgEothisproposatyas'rcferrcdtothccornitteeon
Econoaic and tlonctary lf?airs-as th; Gomit'tc-c'rcsponiiUte and to the
Connittee on Budgets and the comit.tel on'igricutture fbr their ''
opinions.
on 23 Septenber 19EO ths GmittCc on Econooic'aifd tfiorretarf Af'fairs
appointqd tr Eewtcr rapporteur' i
. 
'l ': ' .
It considered this colniission proposat at ftg &ditinEs of 28 october 1980,
25 Novernber 19E0, 20 January and 30 January 1981 and at this Last"meeting
adopted thc notion for a resotution (Doc' 1-E71lE0)
In the vote in pl.cnary .ittittg thc Ctlhliss'ionri proposat for a directive
fail,ed to securt the naiority of thc votes cait''Pursuent to RUte 55(3)
of 
.the Rul.es of Proce&r1e Partiadnt'decideU n:t t: v:te::^tl" l*t-
for a resotution 
"nd 
to iefcr the tatter back.to t'he'Comrrittee on
Economic and ilonetary Affairs''
The committee on Economic and tlOngtary Affairs conSidered this item at
its rneetings of 13 and 11 hy 1gE7,21 ard ?? llay 1981 and 9 and 10 June
19E1.
,E1, the Connission announced uhatAt the neeting ot 21 and ?2 IaY 1!
anend|ents it routd rake to its proposat for a directive if PartiaDent
adopted it.
At the nceting of 9 ard 10 Jtne 19E1 the Conittee on Economic and
iionetaryAffairsreiectedthiscorprorisepropobatfrorrtheCoimission
and decided to rnaintain its rciection of the propoidt'for a directive'and
to kcep the motion for a resotution unehalugd, (Doc. J-871./E0./II) '
rlj
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During the ptenary sitting of lE June 1981, the Connission stated that
it uas ritling to lake r 3tudy of thc.inptications of continuing the
harmonization of ttxGs othcr thap turnovcr telcs vhich affect
colrsunption of nanufaoturcd tgbacco. Pcnding.thc resu[ts of this
inquiry the GOnmissioa proposat ras rcfcrred back to the Comnittee on
Econonic and tlonetary Affairs, pursuent to RuLe E5 of the'Rutes oi
Procedure.
By Letter of 4 tiarch 19EZ the Comission forrarded to Partiament a'report
on the impticationg of furthtr harnonizetion of the excises on nanufac-
tured tobacco.
At its oeetings of 2E fray 1982 lnd 20 october 19E2 thc Committee on
Economic and itonetary Affairs considered the Comnission proposaL furthbr
in the tight of this report and at the Latter meeting adopted the notion
for a resotution and the GxpLanatory stote[ent by 10 votis in favour and
8'abstentions. ,
The fotLoring rcre preaent uhen the vote ras taken:
t{r J. tloreau, chairrqn:.tr'Bculer, rapporteur; tr Beazley, l{r von BiSmarck,
ilr Bonaccini, [rlr CehOrn, ilr Dcsouches, iiss Foister, ]lr Giavazzi,
lrlr Griffiths (dcputizing for ilr tla[ter), tr Herman, Itr Hopper,
ilr Papantoniou, llr Prag (deputizing fOr tir de Ferranti), lir Rogalta
(deputizing for ilr tihr), Iir RuffoLo, Ilr Seat (deputizing for l{r Rogers),
trtr van Rompuy, itr t{edckind (deputizing for tlr Schnitker), l{r tletsh and
Jtlr von llogau.
The opinions ef the Gomittcc on Budgcts and thc Conmittee on Agricu(ture
are attached to this rcport-
ggUIEUE
A. I,IOTION FOR A. RESOLUTION
B. EXPLANATORY STATEiCNT
Opinion of the ConnitttG on Bt$cts
0pinion of the Cqnnittcc oh lgricutture
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AIhe Ccmdttee on Econcndc and lbnetary effairs tEreby subnits to the Eurqean
parlianent the follomring mctim for a rercIutiqr toEetter with oplanatory staterent:
ITOTION EOR A RES'3LT,TION
closing tfreproce&re for'onsultatiqr of the Eurqean Parlianent qr the proposal
fron the @nnission of the European Commrnities to the Councit for a directive
amending Directive 72t4641EEC on taxes other than turnover taxes tJhich affect the
consumption of manufactured tobacco'
lte E\.rrmean Parliarent
- havirrg regard to the prcposal frcnr the Conrdssion to the Co[rill,
- having been .-pnsulted by tle Cor:rpil prursr,nnt to Art-icles 99 and 100 of the
- having, regard to the report frcrn the Grmission to the Errrcpean Parlianent on
the inptications of further hargpnization of the elrcises on manufactured
tobacco (O0t"l(82) 6I final),
- havirry regard to the ttrird report of the Acnrnittee or Ecorcmic and lbnetarlt
Affairs and the cpinions of the Ccsnittee m Brdgets and the Ccrnflttee on
Agriculture (ooc t -789182) 
"
- having regard to the result of the vpte on.tln prqosal fron the Ccnrrissiqr,
I. Underlines the objective of harnsrizatiqr of ta:res qr natnfactured tobacco,
nanrely tXat ttrc ta:<es on the consr.nptior of these pro&rcts shall be levied in
such a way ttrat conditions of orpetitisr are rrct, distorted and free lll3\renEnt
of t}ese prodtrcts wittrin the Cqnrunity is rrct, inpeed.
2. Stresses at ctre sanre tinre the basic principle of price forrnatisr in respect
of manufactured t&acco laid dom in the Council .Directive of L9722 i calls
on tle Ccnnrission to ensure ccnpliance wittr ttris PrfurciPIe of freely forred
prices in the various llenber States and to study closely tlre crrrrent national
sitqation in ttris regard and to report qr lt to Parlianent aEi soon as possible;
3. Draws attention to the lengthy &lays r*trich have occr:rred in abolishing dis-
criminatory practices by natioral nranufastu:red tobacco noncpolies within the
neaning of Article 37(1) of the ffi lteatyi expriesses its hrbt's ag to the
fiunness of the Ccnnrissim's action and caLls on it to take innediate steps to
ensul.e that any remaining instances of discriminatior by these nurqolies €rre
abolished as smn as Possi-bLe.
rol 
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4. Stresses ttrat under no cilewstErrces stnrld cUrpetitior in count-ries with a
national rrDnopoly be distorted by srbsidization of the prodrcticr of national
rrDncpolies, a Practice wtrich nlIrs counter tO Article 37(1) of the EEtr Treaty'
and rrcnders wtrether, in view of the heaw Loses made and rierlr lor prices in
ttrese cauntries, ttris principle is in fact being dsenred; wishes to be infoned
as s@n as posisble of tJp results of the cclr|aissidrrs inrrcstigation into the
price deterrnilation policry of these naticral nanufactr:ring nurcpolies;
ackncmle@es tJrat as a result of ttris investigatiqr tle nEtter of price fixing
policy in E'rance has already been brorght before the Court of Justice and tnrsts
that serious consideration will be given to u,te question of whetler similar
actior is necessary in the case of ltaly'
Takes the view $tat iJl or&r to gain a tIaE pictr:re of the financial sitr:atiqt
of the state nonoi-rIy, Directive 8}/723/EEE, on transparenClr in financial
relations betr,veen Melrber States and pulclic undertakings is necessary; erphasizes
once again in ttris regard the urgent reed to'irrptenent ttris directive as
rapidly as Possible;
l.totes that the jnterpenetration of nationaI markets overatt is in many cases
stiLL reLativel,y weak and that there are significant differences in the tax-
exc[usive prices of cigarettes in different markets, but does not believe that
the votume of intra-Community trade atone is a good indicator of the effects of
the first two stages of harmonization, if onty because manufacturers wishing to
estabL.ish trade in another l,lember state are free to set up LocaL manufacturing
faci [ities and have often done so (except uhere manufacturing is reserved to a
state monoPoLY) i
Disagrees with the proposaLs for a third stage of harmonization and considers that
ihere is now no aLternative to a proLongation of the second stage pending the sub-
mission of finaL p'oposats that take into account aLL aspects of this
harmonization issue, inctuding the rutes governing col'Lection of excise duty.'
BeIieves, however, that the Commission's report to the Euro;rean Partiament does
not adequateLy provide a basis on uhich it is possibLe to judge rhat the
retationship bettreen the specific and the proportional etements of totaL
taxation shoutd be at the finaL stage; stresses that this retationship is uLti-
mateLy determined by the muLtiptier and the tax burden and points out that
especiaLl.y in the current ctimate of increasing rates of tax a specific
component higher than the 20I proposed by the Commission woutd be desirabLe for
the finaL stage; stresses that the decisive criterion in estabIishing the finaL
stage must be that the tax system should as far as possibLe permit undistorted
competition, irrespective of whether this requires comparabLe efforts from the
various lvlember States;
.- 
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5.
6.
7.
B.
9. Betieves that the Commission's proposaL does not take proper account of thi's
tatter consideration; and emphasises the difficulty of achieving progress on
tqbacco harmonization yhitst not at,t ilmber States have compLied fuLty t,itti the
provisions of the first and second stages, particuLarly in viev of Articte 1-4
of Councit Directive 72lk64lEEC; 
,
Consider3 thet the proposat for reducing the minimum excise duty is premature.
Considers aLso that the atternativq approach to harmonization, nameLy to
harmonize the ad valorem etements of tax as a proportion of the'retail seLting
price, is tikely to be nore effective than the present approach in providing
uniform conpetitive conditions and'ca,t[s on the Commission to reconsider this
approach rhen preparing any subsequent proposa[i
Notes that, accord'ing to the Commission, use has not yet been made of the '
possibitity of exctuding customs duties from the basis of assessment of ad'
valorem excise duty on cigarettes sb that removat of this option can have no
major repercussions: agrees therefore rith the proposat that inc[usion of
customs duties in the basis of assetsment of excise duties on cigarettes shoutd
be obtigatory;
13. points out that the catcutation of the financiat imptications for the Community
budget is incomptete and based on static as$umptions;
14. Invites the Commission, after.onrriting the parties concerned, to put forward
a proposaL on harmonization of the method of colLection at the same time as the
proposal. on the final phase of the harmonization of taxation. i
10.
11.
12.
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I.
B
ESIAIIAIONY STAIE!,IE!tT
-I. Introdrctian
rtre cormittee orl Esrcrdc and lrretary Affairs rus had a nrxber of &tailed
discussiqls qr the prqorsaf frcnr tJe Ccrmdssiqr of the trtrcPean Ccmunities
to tlE CcurEiI ffi:riry ttre third stap of trarerurizatiqr of eNcise &rties qt
manufrtrred toba@ .(Drc; L-328/801. Drring tlrese discussios quite a ntrter
of rrnbers asted for firrtler infornaticn or posbible altcrnaEirre 4pr:whes
ard argmrts ftp;rstratirrg that the 4pnoactr prqosea. by the Cormissiqt
ms the nost suit ble. Since ttE Comtsssict ms r:nable to Present ccrvircing
arg6Ents, tlE Comrittee qr Esrcsric and Ucretary Affairs finalty adryted a
,,tc,tim for a resohrtiql rejectirry the prcposal for a third sta9e of harnsrizatiqt
and r*rictr, in paragreh 6, called qr the Ccnnrissiqr to carry ort a study- Tttis
paragr+h ms rcrdgd as follors:
16. reqlnsts the Cqmtissim tlerefore to investigate €rs soon as possible
wtEther as regards ttE final stage it rculd not be nre reutral fr€tn
ttn point of vi.a of cryetitisr to detcrndre tle effects of
prcportioat taxatiqr on retail pnices than to fix tlE relationship
betriEen tne specific ard pnqorticral ccnPqEnts an drty; I
DuIing its sittirry of 13 Etsbnary 1981, Parliarent rejected the pncposa-I for
a directive and prrqsant to Rrle 35 of the Rules of Pree&re, referred the
rptio,r for a resolution back to the ccnrrittee qr Eoqrcrnic and lbnetarY Affairsl
as the @rmissim had not withdram its prcposal-'
At its rreetirqs of 2L ar:d 22 May and 9 and 10 June 1981, the Ccrmitte on
hncndc and lbnetarlz Affairs had talks with !'tr IIreE{DIIAT, !ffier of the
@rmission. At that stage the Ocnmissiqr was prepared to anend its PrcPosal,
prorri&d parliarent ryproved the prcposal for a directive sr:bject to the follorirq
anendrents;
- to restrict, harnurizati.qr prorrisionally to the secqrd ptrase of the tttird
stage originally propoeed, nanely that as frcrn I Janr:ary 1982 the anrumt of
the specific excise drty leviednas to be rpt less than 7.5t and not rtcre
than 42.5t of tlc total tax trur&n;
- in the nearft,irrE tlE Cclmissiqr $ur1d carry orrt the investigatiot reryested by
Parliaent.
2.
3.
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4. fhe Cfirnittee orr Econsnic and ltmetary Affrirs rejecfed the ccnpronise prcposal
and rryheld its nbticr resolutiqt.
:
During parliarent's Jr.uE 19SI pa;-Sqssion, Itlr 1tffil0rAttl stated that the
Ccnrnission was revertheless prepared to.ttEet Parliarcnt.'s request and carry
91rt the strldy it had asled fon. Farlianent r,ould ttrus be able to deliver an
cpinior on tJe prcposal qr tJre be,pis of tle study's findings. the ccnmission's
prqosal $,a6 rpt, to be withdram hrt oegsideration of it in ttre Corncil was
to be srrspended pending tte qrtore of the sturdy. ltre regnrt was therefore
refeffed ba[:k to tte Connitte qr Eomordc and Mcnetary Affairs Pur$rant to
tuIe 85 of the RrLes of Predrre.
Ihe rE).t sectiqr cqrtains addittqtal ccrllEnts prcrptea by the corruission's
study (GH(82) 6t final) with hE rplr bebn ma& available. Ihere is no need
here to anaryse the uhole cormissiqr prcposal again, sjnce tJris, has already
been &ne in the elglarntory statenent to the first report (poc. L-8:7L/80/rTl
to Hhicfi t}re rea&r is neferred. ,
II. Basic prirrciPles feE-the. of excise drties tes laid dotut
in tte first Ccnmcil directitte o! t9 Decenber L97
Itre recitals to tle directive clearly &firE the csrditions lvttich the systen
of taxation on ttp ccrsurptim of nwrufac€ured t&acco mrst Batisfy in or&r
to be in corforrnity rrith tlE Treaty. ltre first recital of tlre directive reads
as follcrus:
rt{tEreas the ejective of th lbeaty is to establish an econcrnic union
within $Jtrich ttEne is tealttry cctrpetitian and vrtpse ctraracteristics
are similar to those of a futestiC nrarketi dndr as regards'nranufactured
tdacco, acfrievenent of $ris airn presrryposes ttrat the ryIication in
the !{erber States of taxes affecting the cursrrrption of products in t}ris
sector &es nd distont qrditiqrs of ccnpetitiqr and dres nort, fupede
thejr fnee npvenent witttin the Cornnnrityi'
AnorEter recital ri:ads as'follo,us3
rwtlereas, as far as erccise drties are corcerrnd, harrpnization of stnrctures
[ust, drutg o't]Er thitqrE, resutt in ccrpetition in the different categories
of rnanufac€ured t&acco belorying to the safie groqP norE, being distorted
by tJE effects of the ctErging of the tar and, @nseqtEntly, in the
qenirq of tlre natiqral rnrkets of the lErber states; I
{'a{_
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Ttris stsm clearly trrat th prinary ai.m of harmrizing the taxation
of nranuf*tured tSre is to estSlish a syEtem shictt is neutral fron the
point of vierr of 'ooqetitict ad {hich en$lcs the fr€e rc\r@nt of ttnse goods
witJrilt any distctict of ooqpetitict.
Article 4(3) of ttp diretitp faya &m tfc arruTmrts for the final
etage of trarmuri?ftf.cr p aB to o;lty rltlt t.h:[e requirurt of rantrality
fron tte point of vte*i of oqetitict:
'At, tIE final st4s oG hansrizatim of stnrtures' tlE sane ratio shall
be est&listEd fc cigarcttee in'rl lffier Staites befireen ttre prqortianal
excise drty and t}a apecific eocir drtyl in adl a E!2 tlEt t}re rarge of
reaif sellirg prfes rcf'I€cts fatrly ttc diffecap in ttE'marufrtlrers'
&lirury priea'.
?. Sre reitale aleo drtain iltrtEr i4lctdrt basic prfurfple, nrcIy the free&n
to fix pries,
rffiEas tte inperatirrc tEdB of orytiticr iryIy a qTst€m of frely
fond piea fu all grcp of uuf,rttred tdro.r
Itris prirrci;lb is cluif,td furtE tn frticfe 5 of tte Airectirrc rfiictt
reads as follcrrs:
tMantrfacturers fia irycters shall be free to GetmirE tle rnaximnr
retail *lIirry prie fc edr gf tlttr Frodrts. Itris pnouisict nay
rprt,, tuever, hin&r iplmtatfm ,of tlE natimaf sysEems of legislaticr
regardiry the;qrtrol of ;rie fctnl.e c tlE cbeepare of inposed
lxieE. t
In or&r to attain tnie eJ*tive of ftu nurwrt of mrnf*tured tdac@
witldn the Ocmgr lrlarliet, fr flo di!tG,i.gr! of oqetitiqr, tlc directititg
cpts fc a tax stnrtrr€ lfiidr ocr6ira a prqctimaf encise drty with a
specific ercise &rty. Xtc ratio befipt the ryecitic oorpoent and ttE
prqorticral olpdsrt, of ercige drty cr cigrettes in the nmt pqrlar pricb
cat€gory is to be gadully tumtzed rrttil, in tlE ftnaf stage, it is
sposea to be iffi,ical in all lder 8t ta6.
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in tlre fhal retail selling price. Consequently, if cost prices fa1l, tte drop in
go\renrrEnt re\rcrruE is gareater than tllg drw in the prodrcer's revenue, so that
tlre prodrcer tras a strrcrg i-rerrtive to lqrer his pnioes. Itere afe those who
ar{nre, tlEr.efore, that ttnse pnice redrctims vurld be emtlated b,y other
nranufactr.uers, Ieadirry to a fall in prices across the board- In that e\rent,
tne goverrnEnt wculd ta dliged to raise ttre rate of taxatim if it wished
to nnintain the leve1 of pr L€\renue.
10. Certain natiqral professianal asseiatims repeatedly clairn that a hi$r
m,.rltiplier rurld lead to a prioe war, resultirq in a &lunnards prioe spiral
and a fall irl - a situation v*rich cqrld urly be avoi&d by stricf
go\rernrEnt price cqrtrols. At present, &sPitc t.tte fact that the mrltiplier
is high in a ntnber of !ffier Sta@s, tlere is no sign of such a aosnuaras
price spiral. Is ttris crrtdu.oat price war avoi&d bryr prodrcers forming
cartels on Eryr strict govemflent price cantrdl? l[tris vnrld run co.rnter to the
Canrrcil directirrc ,rlhilh stiprlates ttrat prices m,rst be freely eermired.
Certain represenEa'tives of the tcbacco irr&rstry maintain tjtat the price controls
in scne !E$er Slatcs & in fact, infringd the Cormcil dir*tive of L972. the
Ccnnrissiqr has rierlz tiitfe to salz in its study qr the obj""t of the price
control rrE.lsrures in fonce in the varictrs l,ted$er Stat-e,sr [.Iere, qte m.rst
distingruish betrgl the txp !ffier Statcs tfiich harrc a natiqral cqmercial
n19nppoly for nranufactured'tcbEpco, narely-Frarpe and Italy, md tlE other
!,tefitrer States. ltre situatiqr in t}e trp forrrer ccuntrics will be orildned
s@arately un&r (b).
11. Ar:Eicle 5 of the Comcil directive of L972 stipnrlates that rnarufacturers
and irponters strall freely &termine the nraxirnun t etail selling prices of thei-r
pnodrcts. It g6s qr to say, hcrrever, that ttris provisiqr m.rst rrcrt. cqrstitute
an dstacle to the inplenentation of naticnl legislatior ct price cqrtrols
or the obsenarpe of inpeed prices. In the current ecqronic situatiqr, wittt
its pr$lans of inflatian, errerlz lErber State enforoes prioe cqrtrols of
one kind or anottEr. trhbrrally, cigarettes, l*tictr are inclu&d in the retail
price in&c, are also subject to these curt-roIs. vilhen applicatiqrs are matb
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for rises in cigarette prices ttre conflicting interests of the lttinistry of
Ecmcndc Affairs and ttre ltinistry of Finance have to be rtreighed one against the
orther. I?rc prfue conern of the l{inistry of Ecorsnic Mfairs is naturally to
eurb inflatiqr, and therefore applications for price increases are subject to
critical exanination. 'Ihe lttinistry of Finance on the orther hand, wtrere a high
ad valorcn tac is fuposed on rnarufactuned tdaceo, has no djection to an
increase in nranufactuned tcb€rcco prices because it reans an increase in'ta:<
revenue. Gitlen that ttre gorenrrEnt has a greater interest in price increases
in cigarettes than in other prodrrcts, price controls on cigarettes are r:nlikely
to be stricter tlran fon ottrer prodrrcrts; on tlre contrary, a price increase is
Iike1y to be alproved nrcne easi-Iy for nnnufactured tdErcco ttran for other
gmd.s.
t2. Ihe arguent 6xrt fonnrard again and again by ttre indtstry trcrrrever concerns
price redrctions. Horever, in the crrrrent econsnic situationr price redrctions
are srtrenely rare. Wittt inflation and the attendant increases in cost prices,
price novenents are always up and never dcrirn. adnittcdly r:n&r norrml
national price cont-rol arranlrelrEnts ttrere is nottring to stqr price reductions.
It tryu.tld be interesting, ttorrerrer, to hear frcnr the Ccmnission of any o<anples
of genuine redr:ctions in price or of applicatiqs to redtrce prices wtrich harre
been turned d:rdn by price control authorities in paptio:Iar lEr&er States.
In this cmnectiqr it is $rortfr recalling Article 10 of the first directirze of
L972 on the harrmization of ta:<es op rnanufactrrred t&acco, wtrich stipulates
that !'lenber States may ler4g on cigarettes a minjJrurn o<cise futy, the anctrnt
of r'ittich rnay not exceed 908 of theqgregate arrr.urt of the prqorticnral o<cise
dtty and the specific excise drty rafiich ttrey leqr on cigarettes in the npst
pryrlar pric€ categoLT. lhis prorrision also atrpears in ttre second directive
and five ltffier States have already incorponated it in their national
legislatior. As at I Janr-rar? 1980 the situatiqr in ttrese co:ntries vras as
follcl,rs: Belgir-un, Bfrs 0.968iper cigarette = 90t of the normal erccise futy;
Luxefiborrg, Lfrs 0.42 per ciganette + 598 of the norrnal e><cise futy;
Dletherlands, Hfl 0.03948 per cigarette = 58S of the rprrnal- o<cise futy;
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Frarrce, ET O.O3O per cigarette = 60t of the normal excise d'ty; Gernwty'
Dt{ OO75 per cigarette = 89t 
": 
* rnrmal o<cise drty' Ttris provision is
partiarlarly useful in the cases r&ere the prcporticnal carpnent of tttg
e:rcise Art!, is veq, hi$. The abore corrtries vhich have incorporated ttris
prwisior into their natiqral legislatian are all oorrtries, wittt the occept-
im of the Fecbrat Reruulic of Gernany, $Jtlich harle a hi$o ad valorem occise
duty. rixiJtq this minimm e;<cise drty artificially rrestricts the price range
of cigarettes and nakes it possible to arrcid a qrt-tltroat price war w"ith a
dcffn{ards price sPixal. :I?ris applies parEicrrlarly to Belgirln uhefe the ndni-
nr.un excise drty is set at 90t of the rprnsl excise Arty' Altltcn$ tte Fe&ral
Reprblic of cernuny also tras a minimsn ecrcise arty $fiictt is 90t of the rprn|al
encise futy, its ac'liral effect' is less markd tt6n in Belgirmr since it
contains a hidr specific cqponent. In Belgir.m, the existcnce of a minfui':m
er(cise &rty of 9ot of the rmral excise drty ruas tte basis for a judErent by
the Ccrrrt of Justj,e (Feeab case). Ttte Ccurt ruled that Belgim re$flatiqts
in respect, of taes on con$fiptiqr, ntrictr are predcninantly prqc:tiolral,
and price ccntrcls which set, the minim,m excise drty at 90t of the norrnal
occise futy, tE\re Led to a sitrratian w?rere rnantrfacturers and inportcrs are
practicatly un$Ie to ocnpete wifi eacft ottEr qr the basis of the differerpe
in retail price. Ihis, cl6tcltrsiqr crly apties to Belgir.un horever, since in the
other !E$er states $trich have a syst€m of minimm encise futy, it is fir<ed
at not nore than 6Ot of the rprnu.l orcise &ty. A minim.un excise duty set at
this lerrel atlcrrs a rnrch wi&r range of prices and yet, althcirgh taxation in
these lErber State5 is matnly prCpontiqral and altlrcu$ minimm prices are
no,t, mrch in evi6pg, there is no sigd eitter in these !ffier States of a
qrt-throat price mr wtrictr rrctrld rezult in a &Hnrmrds price spiral.
13. lbnce, in a1l t6ber Statcs apart fnor lta1y and France the price cqttrols
applied to tsacDo Erre no differcrrt frcrn tIre applied to other prodrct's ttrder
naticnal priqe ocrrtrol legislatian, Ihe crly excepticr is the. possibility of
settirq a ttrinimm excise efiry. Egeentially tterefore these !ffir St'ates tnrrc
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c611plied with the prirrciple of free &terminatiqr of prioes as set cnlt in the
1972 directirre. Ihe Comissicl +crild pay close attentiqr to future &rrelop-
rrents in this field in tlE varianE lErber States to ensure that they cotply
wittr tlE prirciple of free Cerminatiqr of pries.
14. IffiriI1g the minim,rm orcise 6:ty to 80t of t.tte Arty an cigarettes in
tle net pqrlar pri@ categorl, wi.Il encorage prie corpetitian, witictt is
restrictedbythepossibilitlzoffixin,aminiJlrrne<cisefuty.Tttisis
particufarly true of the Belgian situd'idl. In or&r to malG as m'rch progress
as pcsi-bt€ tCInards actriwirq the djectives of t)E Lg72 basic direct'ive,
in particular the fTee eerminatiar of prioes and a fair reflection of the
differere in nunrfActurers' sellirrg prices and retail selling prices, efforts
shgtild be rna& to abolish the minimn excise drty qr npnufactured trbacco
ocnpletely in ttE final stage.
15. 91re qlpstiqr vfiictr arises in ccrectiqr r,vittr free &erminatian is $rttether
G rpt. nnntrfacegrers are ccrchrding agreeflEnts c forming cartels for the
Frrpoge of prie fixirq and thereby infrirqing Article 95 of the ffi TreatY.
al1, the tdacco nrarlcet in lGfrer States Yrittr a hi$t ad valorem ta:<
lerrel, atgre anly a smalf nurber of nnrnrfac€urers qErate, provi&s an ideal
sitgatiqr fon prioe agrcssrts. I?erefore, the Cormissiqr sfufld check verY
careftrlly that the mles ar cqpctitiqr set. ant in the Tfeaty of Rote, part-
icularly in Article 85, are being &sened.
(b) llatianl nrarufacfi.rred tcbacco ttsrcpolies
16. IrnEn the Ccnmnity was fonred trm lGnber States had national ccrnercial
nuraolies for nranrfactured teaece wittlin the neaning of Article 37 of the
f Tneaty: in Etalre, SEf,tA had a nsrc6lofy of both the nranufasEr::re and the
dtolesale of nramrfr€r;red t6@, in ltaly ttEre was AAIS. Art'icle 37 of
the EE Treaty stiprlates that lbrber Stat€s stlall progmessively adjr:st any
state rUrcpolies of a cornercial ctraracter so as to ensune that uhen the
transitiatal period tras enffi rp discrirnilatim reflardirg the conditists
tl
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under which g@ds are pro&rced and nrarketed e><ists betr,een nationals of l4enber
States.
Attlrcugh the transitidtal period ended long ago, the t&acco mcncpolies of a
ccnnerrcial ctraracter in ltaly and France harre still not been entirely dis-
nrantled. Agre€rEnt betrrcen the ccmrflssiqr and the lErber states in question
on nost of tlre points o'r vfrictr these nuropolies l€re still infringing Ccrnst
I{arket reguLatiors wasi rpt reached until quite recently.
17. At the end of last year the ccmnissiot reaclred an a{'I'eefiEnt w"it}r France
on tlre rrEasures to be taken to abolish those aspects of tte nonqoty regulations
wtrich had been fulared illegal. Itrese included in particular an amendlEnt
to ttre disciplinary regrurlaticrs iJreosed qr ret'ai} tra&rs, adjustnrent of
credit cqrditims, suspensiqt of r-rniform tra& disco:nt, abolition of ccnr
trtlsory franco &liveries and qening up trbacco ret'ailing to all Ccrmmi{
natiqrats. AccGdiJry to the Ccnnrission these nEasiuLres !Yu1d Eut an end to
discr'irninationwithin tfre neaning of Article 37 of the ffi Tfeaty and r'uere to
be spread o\rer a period frcm the @inning of 1982 to the end of 1983, so that
hrlz I January I9g4 at the latest the Frenctr tdrcco nu,rcpofy vnrld ccnply wittt
the provisisrs of the TBeaty. After France had un&rtaken to a@t the above
rrEasures, the ccnmissian deci&d to suspend the infringanent preeedings wttich
it had instituted against Franceonthebasis of Article 169 of the ffi Treaty.
the ccmnissiqr also initiated infringenent prredings against Italy qt the
basis of Article 169 of the m ryeaty. ltris prcrpted the rtalian Govenment
to anncunce a nufier of neasures afured at prtting an end to discrirninatory
practiees by its national nurcpoly. Ihe neasures &alt with suctr questions
as the rethod of qerating and nnnaging t*rolesale establistnrents, pro&rct
packaging, cqrditiors of paynent of tax starps, and so qr. These llEasures
satisfied nost of the Ccmflssiqr's cbjectians, altlurgfl nottring was &ne
abdrt the ccngrlsory retail nrargin. Since the Ccrmission was r:nab1e to reach
agreellEnt with the Itatian'Gorrcrrurent on ttris Pofut, the infringerent
preeedings initiated un&r Article 169 of the ffi lYeaty rrere resr.ned and
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the rmttcr was brorght befce tlre E\rqean Corrt of Justice (Case 78/82). As
regards the otlpr points rdtlich had been resolved satisfacEorily, the infringe-
mnt predrre was wsPended.
lE. A1thctr$ tle discrfunimtory practices by the Ita.Iian and French norrcpolies
are 1gi'{ grad.rally beirrybrar$rt E'o an end, it m.rst be pointcd qrt ttrat ttre final
date for ttris laid &wn in Article 37 of the m Treaty tras lurg since passed.
t?ris raises the qgestiqr of rfetfrcr the CcrrLissisr nas firm encu$r vis-i-vis
tlEse !ffier States. Hur thcnrSr ccnplete agreenErt tras ncr* been reached
rrith Frarre cr the adjr:srxer.*t of its nurcpo\2, Etarrce stiIl warfts to be girren
until the end of 1983 to intxodrce tlrese rEasures ftilly, &spite the fact
tt6t it f6s krnln for a log whife *ratthese final treasures had to be taken.
In the'case of ltaly, qr the other tnnd, the ccmnissiqt tns still no,t even
reactred a{nreerrpnt m all aspects of the rsrryofy $rhich are dlscriminatory
withirt the neaning of Art'icle 37 of the Erc Treaty'
19. Nthcusr nrcst of the as@ts of adjustirlg the Frerrch and Italian tdacco
nur4olies have been settled, qlere is still cre aspect lvtrich is causirg
sericrrs cancernt n41y. the Hermirurticr of prices in these l'lenber states.
Ttris inclu&s nst orly ttre fixing of ccngrlsory retail nrargins which ecurs
in ltaly and an vttrich, as rentiored ah,e, no agtreerent haq yet been reached
betr,en the Cqmission and ttre Italian auttrorities but also the fixing of
prices generally bo,th in lta1y and Frarrce. Prie. ffu€d by ttre national
nurcpolies 'must nog be srrch tlrat prices of &restic prodrcts are kept artifici-
aIIy lop or that tlpse of inpopted prodrts are fi-:<ed at an abnorrmlly high
Ieyel, tterefy distonting ccnpetitim betl€en dsrestic and inported good.s.
Ihe price of prodrcts nrarnrfactured by the natimal nurcpolies nurst not be
tept abnorrnally lor b,y rcans of, sulosidies. Ihe case latr of the Cort of
Justioe regardirry nurcpolies, and nDre particularly its judryIent of 13 I'tarch
lg7g in the Hansen case (Case 9V78), is perfectly clear qr ttris point:
any actiq1 by a natioral nurcpoly l*rich cansists in nrarl<eting a pro&rt with
the help of ppbli.c firnds at a sellrng price Hhich is abnormally lou in
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in curparissr wittr tlre pnice exclusive of ta:t of a prodrct of cotparable
gality trportea frcrn anotler tffier State is irrcatpatible with Article 37 (1)
of ttc Erc Eeaty.
In the lig[rt of this judErent the prr€ioes of SEIIA in Frarpe and MlttS in
Ita1y strorld be srbjected to clee sczutiny. Adnittdly the Cqmflssion
states in its shrrity that it has initiatetl an investigatict into the fuPact qt
ccnpetitian of the sales polic,y of prodrctipn rurcpolies in Fra4e and Italy.
the inrrcstigaticr oo\,ers ttre retail prices of Gatrloise cigarettes and dis-
tributiqr cets in Italy, as reII as the selling prioes of llS and Naziqn1i,
ttc npst pqular cigarettes qr the reqnctive nurkets.
2A. fte profit and loss accornts prodrced by the Ccnnrission for Sgtt* strou
a negatirre bafarre sinoe L976. ll?re Eterrch Goverrnent attributes these losses
to the trcaqf costs inrplved in paying a large nr^nber of retirenent pensions.
llorcver, in thb lidrt of these teavy losses, a ttnran$r investigation of
SEmAb prie fixfug is absolutely essential. Althor$l SEITA is no longer
r,rn&r the direct srtrol 'of the !{inistqz of Finance and has beerr transforred
into a ccmpany, cigarette pries are still fiJcd by ttE tlinistry of Finance
rpt by SEITA. ll?ris pncnpted the Ccrrnissiur to bring this matter before
the Corrrt of Justice qr 16 l{arch 1982 (Case 90/82)
kcrunissicr stu'ry (ccu(S2) 6I finaf) page 39
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Acacdirq to ttE Ccr:nissicn, flIUS also s[urs a loss for 1979. ItE Italian sit-
uatiqr tse\rer is far frur transparent. tlrli.ke SEITA, AAIIS is nd. a oqany hlt
is un&r the direct cqrtrol of ttE Italjan ttinistry of Finare. A profi.t and
loss mrnt as srrch &es rrt, stist; ttE profit and loss figiures harre to be &-
tained'fr.cm variqrs differeot scrrqea. It is rrrgently lEessary, tterefotrer to
cbtain an rcurate picfirre of tle finarEial situatiqr of tttis state nmcpo\ and
it is relevant in ttris cduetiqt to refen to the reed to irplslnrtt Directive
nfiryEic, cr t-ranq>arorJz of firqtcial relatiqrs betrcn l,tnber States and public
rgdertaffuigs. ftris directirrc is oantestd, turever, by a ntuber of !ffier States
and.ttris tras &layed its inplmltaticr rfiich ms scte&rLed for January 1982.
A tlu:qrgtr furrrestigatiqr of prie fomtiqr in tlEse trrp tffier States is nec-
essarlr, not crly becase of their lesee hrt also in the light of tte relatively
lor prices at ntrictr tlEse prodrts are sold qr their nrarket. by the natimal nst-
cpolies. Ihe fat, that tfre @rnrissisr i,. cqt&rctirq a tfsqrgh investigatiot
into prioe fixirlg policy in Ftae and tras Uror*tt tttis matter before tlE Cotrrt
is tJrerefore a positive st€p. Ibrever it is rot encnrgh, sirrce the &erminatiqt
of prices qr the Italian nurket is also in rEed of tJororyh inrrestigatict.
Parlircnt sould li.ke to be nme firlly infonlEd abort these matters and stresses
tlre r:rgent reed fc rryid pro{Fess to be rna& on this qrcstiqt of price forrm-
tion by tJe natiqral nmcpolies fior nwnrfac-uured t&acco.
21. Certain rrErbers of the cqmirtte have asled vfiether further hampnizatiqt
has to vrait urtil tlte t&a@ nmcpolies have been abolished. I?E first point
to make tere is that alttu4fr tlE abolitiqr of t]rese tdacco ttut4olies.has
taken far nrcre tfur than ms antj,cipatecl in the Treaty, the end of virhrally
all discrtninatory practioes by the t$rcco nwr4olies is rut in sigttt. E\rrtler-
rrore, it is pertr4s useful to ref,er to the table in AnrE:( VII of tJre Comission's
study according to wtrich ttre iryrct of furtler harnsrizatisr qr retail prices is
grreatest in the trc rrwrc[lo\r mrrtries. Iastly, trends qr the tobrcco rnarket in
Italy and Et:ane irdicate that, ttE first s@es of har:urizatisr rcre ropanied
by a reallening of the rnarlcet. positicr of their t&amo rmcpofies: tlreir share
of natiqra-I prodrcLicn in vohxe tsc feU in Etarrce frqn 91.6t in 1974 to
72.42 in 1980 and in Italy frrcnr 70.9t in 1977 to 5I.6t in 1980 (see pages 40
ard 41 of tlE Acnnrissiqr's strdlr). ltris slrsFsts that it is rpE.rpcirable to
interrr+t ttc progess tomrds }rmsrizaticr in @&r to abolisft ttre nu4olies.
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1g1 Neutrality of the PrQosed tar( stnrture frcm the Point of vrieq of
cfiPetitiql
2?. Article 4(3) of tne 1972 directive defines a rputral tatr strrrture as ste
r*rich leads to retaiL prices *lich refLect fairly tle differerrce in nwruf,ac-
turersr selling pries. Ib be abl€ to assess the ta>( struchrre frcrn this point
of vierrr yE rrust first agree qr tfiat is reant hry 'fairly'. Ittj,s term is diffi-
crrlt to defirE ruurately and any attenpt. to & so is bomd td be scrlefiat
$bjective. the!:e is rp fu:bt, tprever, ttrat neither of the tun tar( stnrctures
vfiich existcd in the ltrser States before harnsrizatior @an satisfied this
criterim.
2r. A ntxber of lEr$er Statee ryLied a \rery high ad',alorcn dr:ty to nElnu-
frctured tdacco. Taldng the rwrufacturerrs seUing price as 20t of the retail
sellirrg price, the distrilrutim nnrgin 10t and the total tat bur&n 708, a
percentage variatim in the nranufac'Euren's selling price under a ntrolly ad
valorsn s]rstsn of taxatiqr pro&rc the sarc percentaEe ctnnge in the retail
selling price. Diffenenes in tlE ex-factory price are reflected by a differ-
ence in the retail sellirq price dtich is equivalent to five tfures that of the
ex-factory price; tlnrs, the totat nnrltiplier is five. In this case, the fiscal
multiplier vrtrich r$resents tle ratio of the differre in t}re strn of the manu-
facttrrer's sellirg price and tlre distrihrtion nrargin, is 3.33. Ttris tlpe of
ta( stnrcture, in r*rich differenes in e>r-factory prices are nnrltiplied in the
retail price, givee an adrrantage to Iorer quality, lcner-priced cigarettes.
@anents of ttris trigh aa valorem systet m:rintain t]tat it leads to cut-tlrroat
price curpetition.because differences in ex-factory prices are rnaltiplied
nrany tines o\rer in the retail setling price. lhis leads ultimately to a dobnF
r*ards price spiral, and the gorerruIEnt has tcr adjust the rate of drty if it
wistres to rnaintain it-s tn:< re\rerttE frcrn nrantrfrctured t$acco. this argtnrent
tras already beerr,oplairEd rm&r tte sectiqr a-aIir4; wittr free detenninatim
of prices, in virictr.,it ms pointed ort that aftlror$r serrcral lffien States
trave a high ad 'raloi1m tar( ttEre tras so far been rp enridene ttElle of any
&urrmrds price +iral. It is clear, trever, that an eressively higtt ad
valonenr drty mds to tlE auartry of 'Io,rpried cigarettes ard i-s not
reutral fm t}e pofut of vie af oqetiticr.
24. In oel*ain othr lttsfrer States the tar( an nanuf,&tured tdam prior to
harnsrizati-an qrsisH preminant1y of a specific oryoerrt,, i.e. tlp ccrr
parerrt of tte tar( *ddl r@ins w*nngea irreryectitrc of tfp manufaturer's
sellirg p=i.e. Hrnlrry to ttE exryfe of tle retail selling price of
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cigarett€g, in rdrich ttre ta:< bur&n accounts for 70t, tlre nranufacturerrs
setling price 20t and t}e distributiqr nrargin lot, wittr a specific ccrponent
of 100t rre dtain the follcning reFults: assr-rning an increase in the manu-
frcturer's setling price of 508 and 100t respectively, and a prQortional
irrrease in the distribution nrargin, the final retail price increases by cnrly
15t and 30t respectively. tlence a substantial ctrange in the manufacttrrer's
price (5o-IOOI) results in a prcporLionally snall change in ttre retail price
(I5-30t). CIearIy, ttris Qpe of ta( system gives nunufactqrers no i-ncentive
to keep cost prices &nn and therefore benefits in particular the nore exPen-
sive cigarettes rrittr a high e>(-factory selling price' It folIom that a tan
systsn wittr a high specific ccnpondnt is no npre neutral frcm the point of
vier of ccnPetitior.
ZS. In the 1972 directive ttre CoLsiail tlerefore cpted for a mfuled ta:< systen,
ytrich avoi&d giving lolpr guality cigarettes an rm&re advantage t}rotrgh a
high ad valorern ccmponent and also avoided favor:ring high-gr-rality cigarettes
trrnqrgh a high specific ccnponent. tnder ttris directirre the ta,< on nranufactured
tobacco shorld cansist of bo'ttr a specific ccnponert and an ad val0rern ccnponent.
Ttre objective of the final staEe is that the ratio betr'een the specific and the
ad valorern c'cll]ponent (in sfEch vAT rrras also ircIuded in the second stage) is
identicat in all lGrrber states for the npst peular price category- What is
ttre i&al ratio of the specific c€mPonent to the ad valorem cfiPonent in order
to arrive at a ta)( stnrttrre utrich is reutral frqn the point of vierr of ccnpe-
tition? It is very difficult to calculate ttris point of equilibritln' one
thing r*trich is certain, tlcrEver, is that the first stages of hanronization of
the tax cr nanufactured tsacco rePresent a st€P tpl^,ards llpre neutral condi-
ti.ors of ggpetitiqr: tlte increase iJr the specific ccnporent Qens up the
nrarket to higherpriced, higher quality cigarettes in lffier States whose tar<
on nranufatr.rred tdeco is pre&ninantly pr€Portional and a IIDre q)en rnarket
is created for lonpriced, Iorcr quarity cigarettes in !ffier states wtere the
tax includes a high specific ccfipcnent. Ttte prqosal for a third stage of tnr-
mbnizatim is withcnrt &ubt, a fi.rrther st€P toirards a npre neutral tax structure'
26. As rre fE\re already said, it is difficlrlt to locate ttre point at wtrich
ccnpetitian is genuirely neutrat, t*trich is tlre aim of tlre final stage' the
strccessirre prqosars for the varicus stages of harnsrization have been dnrac-
t€rized largely bry a pragrnatic qlroach by ttre ccnmission with the aim of
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prqrpting ccnparable efforts frcnr lrtsmber states wittr a predcnrinantly ad
valorern tar< and trEse urittr a predoninantly specific tax' To ttris end the
ratio of specific excise drty to the total tax ctrarged was fixed at beilrcen
5 and 75t in tlre first stage. In the second stage of harnpnization ttre ratio'
of the specific ccppnent to the total tar<, wttich includes VAT, was brought
r,rittrin tlre range of 58 to 55t. In ttre prc6nsal for a ttrird stage of harnoniza-
tion no* under consideration, the ratio betreen the specific excise duty and
total ta( tlas been narrcrred to the range of 10t-35t. this appears at first
sight to dsnand a gEeat€r effot frqn countries wittr a high specific ta:<
tlran frcnr those rrrittr a high ad valorern ta<: a'Iready in ttre second stage !tsnber
States wittr a high specific ccnpo4ent had to redrrce ttreir na>cimrln specific
corpcrent by 20t under the harnsrization procedure and are being asked again
in the third stage to redEe the rmxinun by 20t; countries with a high ad
valorern ccnponent, on the o'tlEr rEnd, are only being asked to increase their
nininn-un specific acfiponent in the ttrird stage frcrn 5 to l0t' Thre table in
AnrEx VII of the Ccrmdssion's study illustrates the effect on retail prices
of a change{\rer fr',on the e>risting ta:( stnrcture to ttrat of ttre proposed
ftird stage. It stroms clearly ttrat cor:ntries with a high ad valorern ccmpo-
,nent - prinrarily Italy and EYarEe - will certainly have to nrake an 
effort
curparable to if not greatcr ttran countries wittr a high specific ccnponent'
Ttre price npveflEnt brought abot by the ttrird stage of harnpnization is kept
to less than 2t for practically the vihole market in rrcst lHIber states' Price
rr'velrEnts of betr,reen 2 and 5t are p:ractically negligible in mcst countries and
represent at npst 2.1t of the market, with the o<ception of France rtrtrere 30'4t
ofthernarketr,rouldbeaffectedbystlchapriceclrarrgeandinltalltwtrere2Tt
of ttre nrarket r,.ould be affected. In fact in Italy there will be price changes
of 5 to IOE for 15.9t of tjre nrarket and in EYance for 7.18 0f ttre rnarket'
27. An assessnent of the preosed third stage of harnsrization of the ta)< on
nranufacttrred tobacoo in the 1i9ht of the objective of a ner:tral ta:< stnEEure
frcrn the point of vierr of ccnpetition stro*s that this ttrird stage is definitely
a stcp tor.ards a lrDre neutral ta)( Stnlceure. F\II.theITl|cre, this ttrird stdge
requires corparable efforts of the various l4erber States' Itris &es not
anst€r the qr:estiqr, holerrer, of trhettrer tlE final stage of harrpnizatiqr
anticipated by the ccnrnissiqr will really satisfy the objective of neutrality
frcm the point of vieur of ccrpetition. the Ccnmission prcPoses that the spe-
. 
cific e:<cise &rty stnrld be 208 of the total ta:< in the final phase' A'sstxdng
that the retail price breaks dcmn into 20t nwrufrcturerrs selling price, Iot
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distri-butim nrargin and 70t tar(, the total rrultiplier in the case of an ad
valorem orponent of 80t wiII be rorghly 3. lllnis neans that a change in the
manufacturer's selling price will be rultiplied by a facton of 3 in tle retail
selling prioe. Certain naticmal trade organizatios feel that a ruItiplier
of 3 is t@ high and maintain that this will harte an adverse effect ur quality,
since it is nainly the cleaper I.q,Er quality cigarettes rrttich are farrorrred
under ttris slletsn. Ihey mnt a rrultipLier of 2 wtrich rculd be equivalent to
a specific acponent of 40t of the toEal tan. It nnrst be realiaed tromrcr
that the nranufrctunerrs selling price accpunts m at erage for mly 20t of thc
retail price and that cigarette pro&rticr costs vary \rery litt1e (with a few
exceptions, the differerpe in the ex-frctory coet of cigarettee runufactured
in the comunity ne\rer exceda a frctor of I or 2). Hencc, there is very
Iittle scope for the passing qr to the retail price a differenoc in gx-factory
cost price resulting fron dlfferences in Eulity or npre efficient prod.rctloni
sales are anly atfected htrcn the difference in prod.rction oosts is reflected
in the retail price as a reault of a sufficiently high nultiplier. [IorBverr
it is very difficult to judge vfiether retail prices reflect fairly the differ-
ence in manufrcturers' selling prices with a nultiplier of 3 or vfiether ttris
nultiplier stnrld be scremhat lor,Er. Given that cpinims differ qr ttris
question, it tm.rld seenr advisab}e to witlrhold judgrEnt qr the final stqe
until operienoe fns been gairrcd in tle inplarentatim of the third stage of
harnsrizatidr.
?6. [vlcreover, a m,rltiplier of 3 des not, autcnratically correspond to a
specific ccrponent of 20t. glherc the tu bwden is high, ag in Denmark, ttre
specific ccrponent nuBt be higbr to achieve a rultiplier of 3. ttrr&retandably,
therefore, Eunark will encqmter problens in introd.piJtg the prqosed tax
stn:cture trnless it adjusts its high to< turden. Corce4ently, the Ccnnrieelon
preoses in its study the possibility of a special neasure for Dennrark, so
that mce a m.rltiplier of 3 is reached any furtlpr redrctim in t}e specific
oqnparent may be postponed until the ta:( rates are harnwtized.
CIearIy, the Errpose here is not, to establish a fi:red relatiqrship betrreen the
specific cfiporcnt and total ta.x, but to arrive at a particular nnrltiplier.
A.ssuming tJre target is a m.rltiplier of 3, the ratio of tIre specific ccrponent
of &rty to total ta:< will tlen depend on the total tar( blrrden. Ulder the
Danish syatem, v,rhere tlrc tax burden ie appro:rimately 87t of che retail price,
fhe Eultlpller wiII still only be 2.7 rdhcn tte third etage of hampnization
with its epeclfic cootronent of 35t is lntrod.rced. Glven the tcndency touards
higtrer tal( rat€B in the iEn$er States, it is likety that in order to reach a
-23- ps Tg.pgltin
to.tltiplier of 3 the specific cqponent will be higfrer than t}re 20t indicated
by tlte Cqrmissim, in the otler !ffier States, to.
?9. the praEnatic ryroach $hich rras been ad4ted so far, narely to dernand
broadly equal efforts frurr tte lErber States with a prefuruinantly ad valmn
sltstan and frcm tlre with a pre&ninantly ryecific sletenrr rEy pro\E inryrcprf*e
for the final Etage. ltE final stage nuat first and forsrrst coply as far as
poesible with thc criterlqr of ncutrality fran tha point ol vlen of ourpettttql
and thur otftain ttfficr gtat ! rruy have to be aslcQ to mdto Eroatar cffstf to
rchieve tnc ejectirc o,f a gcnuine connrn nurkct ln mrnufrfirrod t&ffi. Ih.
table in Anno(yllof the Ccmnisalcrrrg BtuA/ i[ustrates tho effectc an rgtail
prices of a chatqFrc\,er frqn tlp oristing til strrcU.w to a tor ctnrtusc in
rdrich tXc specific excise 6rty mmts for 20t of the toEd tan. As in ttD
case of the ttdrd stqe, it is lta.Iy and Erare $hich will be rcguired to rhd(e
the biggest adjustmnts in prioes as a re$rlt of the transitiqr to tlE final
stage. A1thrugh tle aqntries wittr a high specific cqrporunt wilt clearly
ha\re to ntake Just, as great an effort as the otle lffier Stat€s, t}re rtEin yar&
stick b1r yrttictt tlte final pftase Ebutd be judged is rfiettEr it i! in frt,
rptrtral frqn tlte point of, vlqr of corpetitiqr, ild this may rean that theG
oountries trill have to mak! an 6rgrl glrater effott. It la hDrth alanining
in this oqrtrrt nffi,}rr a bettcr my of rclrtcvlng this point of qrlllbrlm
might rnt be a ratio bstwr the rpecific cqanent ard toEal tax of botrsr
20t and 30t, maldng afbwrce for tjre trend in the tax bur&r. OL frctor
wtlictt ruet be talen into mmt rfien definiry the arTaqrcntg fc ttE fhal
plrase is the renpral of tJte poesibility of setting a mini.mn elcirc drty.
Only tlen wiII prie fonutiqr be gcnuinely frc ani tIE ttr( Btrrrtru! rsrtsat
frqn the point of vi.en of o4tstitidt.
the ccmdttee ql Esranic and leptary Affairs takes tlp yien that it is.not
possible at the Pr€ent ltege of hanrsrizatiqr to paEE juds:nt an tle finel
stage. It therefoe calls qr the CqmigEiqr to suhit by the srd of 1985 a
prqoeal for the find rta6 of haramizatim bardl dr an analyrls of trsrdr
ln the varioug nati$at nurtctl, aftcr tJte third phars ha. bcan lully intrr&rccdr
wttich urdsr lts prqoral fc a thlrd diretirc clsrld havc taksr plm fun
.Ianuarlt 1985.
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(d) Alternative a[proach to the harnonization of the tax structure in resPect
of manulEactured t&atco: tra{npnizing t}re percentage of ttp ad valorern
ccnponent in tle retail Pric€
30. In asking the Ccunissisr to study the hanrpnization of the e><cise dutiee
on nranufactured tcbacto, Parlianr$nt asked specifically ttrat the existing
ryroach of harnsrizinq the pencentage of specific e:<cise duty should be
r€ighed against t}e alternative approach, nanrely harnonizing the percentage of
ad valorem dr,rty in the retail price. Is not ttris alternative aSrproach nore
neutral frcrn the point of vien of ccnpetition? Paragraph 6 of tlre notiqr for
a resolution vltrich vras put before Parliarent read as fol}o,us:
'Requests the Comrissiqr tlerefore to investigate as smn as possible
htpther as regards the final stage it r,rould rtot. be rpre neutral frcnt
t6e point of view of carpef,,ition to det€rmine the effect of prcpor-
tional taxatiqr on retail prices ttran to fix ttre relationship bett€en
ttre specific and proPortional cotponents of duty;'
Harnrcnizing the prcportior of ad valorern ta< in the retail price also inplies
harnsrization of the tar( nnrltipiler. I?ris rEalrs that differences in prices
exclusive of ta< in the variors lltsrber States are nnrltiplied to the sane
extent in the retail price, wtrich will create uniform conditions of corpeti-
tion.
31'. lbr€ver, r:niform conditims of ccnpetition, wtrich can be achiwed just
as easily wittr a multiplier of 2 as w"ittr a nnrltiplier of 5, are not s}nonyrDus
with neutral conditions of corpetitior. the problem of wtrich multiplier is
the npst neutral frcn ttre point of view of corpetition still rernains. !bre-
over, it is left to ttre discretion of ttte }ffier States to determine the
total tar< bgrden by setting the specific ccnponent according to their financial
reqqirarents. ltris will lead to a situation uhere higher quality cigarettes
face less ccnpetitiqr in countries wittr a very high specific ta:< ccnponent
than in ccn:ntries wittr a low specific ccnponent, despite the fact that the
prcportional tax ccnponent in the retail price is identical in aII lhnber
States.
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32. As already stated, r:nder ttE Present approach to harnpnization' deterrnining
the level of the prqortimal omPonent in tlre retail 5rice, raises precisely
tJp sarc problenrs as establistring the final phase' Vihg ttre retail price is
made w of 70t tan base, 20t or-factory se11in9 price and 108 distribution rnargin'
a total muttiplier of 3 corresponds to an ad valorsn @rPonent of 56t' The arEu-
nent advanced in stryrport of the Present aPProach, nanely that a total multiplier
of 3 is not neutral frqn the point of vien of ccrpetitisr, and that the target
shotrld be a total rultiPlien of 2, applies equally to t}e alternative a5rproach
to harnonization. rn ttris case the percentage of proportional dttty in the
retail price rrculd have tO be fixed at anly 40t, as ccnpared to tlre 56t prqosed
by the Ccnrnission in its sttrty.
35. If the Ccnmission &es introdr:ce a multiplien of 3, the rninfun'un ta<
burden in all [Gnber stEtes - assuning a'price stnrcture as outlined above -
$ptlld have to be 56t. Ttris is precisely the figrre currently applied in Greece;
in $ain and Portggal, wttich are currently nego't'iating conditions of accession'
the tax burden is lorrer and if the alternative approach r,cre a@ted and the
ad valOrern ccnponefrt harngrized, the ta)< burden'in these countries r"'ould have
to be increased
34. ItE Cqrrdssion arlnres ttrat ultimately the trrc approaches pro&rce the
sane resurt. rf til( frmtiers are to be abolished, urtimately the uttrore
e:<cise duty wiII have to he harnrcnizd. Itris ntsans tlrat under ttle alterna-
tive approach the specific curgnnent will also have to be standardized; ttris
will tead to a ta( stnrcture in rntrich both the specific and the ad valorent
ccrq)onents of duty are a fi:€d prqortior of ttre total futy, wtrich is the
ultirnate objective of the present ryroach. Ttre opposite can also be argued'
nanely that the Present 4proach to the harncnization of excise dr:ties will
Iead inevitably to a situation r'ftere the percentage of proportional drty
in the retail price will be fh<ed r:niformly throughout the Ccnnnllrity, i.e.
the sane end result as wittr tlre alternative approach. Iiltrile this may be
true, ttre stage of full harnpnization of rates of &rty and tar< stnrcture
is a very long-term djectirre-
t.i'
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35. the alternatirre approach to harnsrization therefore poses sirnilar prdl€ns
to tlrose of the present approach. Moreover, although the alterrra._tive ryroactr
creates identical cqrditions of ccnpetition, it provides no better gargntee
that the tar< systan will be netrtral frcrn the point of viervr of curpetition, htdcft
is the ultimate aim of hanncnizatiqr. In the light of these a:rgrrents the
Ccnmittee on Econcmic and l'brretarT Affairs believes ttrat there is no point at
present in ctnnging the o<isting approach to harncnization and feels thTt the
prirrciptes set out in 1972 slronld be upheld.
fV. Conclusiqrs
36. It is a fact ttrat the t&.rcco i.e. cigarette nrarket drich the Cfirrrissiqr'
proFoses to hanrpnize is far fr.cm being a free rqarket wittr rncre or less rcanal
conditions of ccrpetition. Ttre qr.estim arises tlrerefore as to uhether further
hampnization should be postponed util. such conditions harrc been created.
Honever, the first trro stages harre clearly starLed tlre nrarket nrcving ts*are the
&jectives wtrich harnrcnization is intenH to attain. Ttris rylies particular,ly
to countries with t&aceo nonopolies (as shcmn in Table VfI,/41. fnterrrpting
the preess of harrncnization vurld orly lead to &lays on tle rcad to a mrnn Ll
market situation.
37. It nnrst be realized that irrespective of the harnonization rcdet ctnsen ttE
high tor burden (around 708 on average) plays a fuisirre role. Conseqqrtly, the
o<istence of qre single tarc stnrctlre is the biggest single cmtributory, factor
in the achierrenent of equal conditions of ccnpetition. Other factors, srrch as
realth, packaging, taste and orther factors influenced by national legislatian
are also fuportant. It can be concluded that the effects of the pneserrt arut al-
tcrnative approaches are nort. sufficiently different (see also the table jn
Anner( VII of ttte Cfirnissisr's sfirrdy) to warrant a change in the systanr. There is
also t]re fact that the trrc systerns ultimately converge in ttre final stage.
Iast1y, the question raised by the existing d.ifferences is l*rich is better: a
rurltiplier of 2 (na:rovr price ranges) or 3 (s1ightly wider price rangesl? Dec-
islve argtuents in favour of one c the oLher harre nort. been forttrccrning. tEver-
tJreless it does not atrpear desirabl-e to introduce multipliers much lqer than 2
or higher than 3. ltris might have a bearing on the prcposal for tte final stage
in a sitr.ration of increasing ta:< rates. ' -
38. What has been said in the preceding paragraph raises fuibts about the aooept-
ability of the prcposed 20t for tlre specific ccnponent of duty. I?ris rm'rld result
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in a multiplier of nore than 3 in the present tan situation. It trculd seent
desirable, therefore, to airn for a specific ccnponent of at least 258 or 30t.
Adnittedly this rdil.d rr.ur a sorcrfiat great€r effort by the state-rlstoPo1y
Uorntries, but on t1re.oEtEr'hand it has adrrantages fftm the point of vielw of
ofiPetitidl.
39. fhe C611111issi6r,s prcposal in respect of Derrnark is the only cptict gitren
ttc relatively high ta:( tx.lr&n in Deflrark. rt once again Lln&rlines the &sir-
ability of a sligtrtly htgher specifiScnpcinent in the final stage to arpid an
' enoessively high rultiplier. ltre ccmrrittee can therefore neoonrend approval 'of
ttE cqrnissiqr's pnqosals qr the basis of the follcnring octnsi&rations:
- integrrytiry haflutizatiqr rrctrld in turn &Iay the prress of crreating free
coqPetitict;
- ttii'altcrnative systenrr in particular wittr regard to oorpetitiorr offer^s rp
particdiar *lvantaEes o\Er tb pesent system'
' 
-.botJt slrstems qnlerge in the ffuial'6tige'
t{tEn the finat stage is introdured will, tprEver, depend, firstly, ql'ccnF
pliane with Article 37 of the Erc T?eaty by l.ffier stat€s wi.th state rrylies
:4j and, seordly, cr tln ilbnpletirr by all lEIbeE states of the secqrd stage of
harnsrizhtiqr.
' Ih Cotrnittce mst resene.its positisr turever tvittr regard to the prcpooals
'oq,,crhtrry ttE final st4B. In the light of trends in tar( rates in Particaflar ' '
a specific ccrqorcnt"sli$rtly higher than"208 tturld seenr desirable.
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t. Ttrit popocal for a Council dircctivo concerns thc Lhird atage ln thc
hrrrnonizatlon of th. .tructura of rxctcc duty on slg*rcttal' Exeiatr (ugy
on eigarrttcr lc rro,Jc up O( two comllonCnttt a Epo\',ltl,.'r'rurp66dnt [ltd n
proporttmel component. Und.r tlre lraeic Councll rtiroutivG No. ?2/41t4/&illc
the amount'of th€ epcclflc.rxelre drrty and the late of Lh€ pfoport"lonf,I
exciee duty muat be the aarne for aII clgarettes. .thG rltlo botwq€n th. trro
comlroncnte 1l ,not preecrihed. Thia ratio gtill diff€rs esnalderably fron
Mcriber stat6 to ilornber strts and ia the subjcct of tha harrmErlgetion psoco.l
which nurt lead to the retail lclllng prlcca r.flGctthg fairly thc
nanufaeturirs, eelting prtccs" 'fhlr can only 'oe tho casa ilraa tbt proportloEr
eomponenE io largc cnough.
2. Il} thc first stago of harmonization lrom I iluly 1973 to 30 June Ig?3 -
'rubreguortl,y Grrlttdcd until 30 *Iunr I?'i8 - the apeelf,lc compOncdt of th.
rxclcl duty haU, ln mch tlmibrr..Strt. Eo bo wlthin th. rmgt 5'?59(. In th.
sceond .tag. flnrn I JuIy I9?8 t,o 3I Deconbor 1980 tha dlttaGaner hud tg ba
r,"rtueGd Eo b.twGorr 1ir6 rnd 55* of th. totrl tax (oxcll! th.tty + VAl') on
cigtrcttol in thG mott popullr prlcr cat'auory. fh'" thJr:<l rttEl {lom
I Jnnrrary lggl to 3t DGscr$rr 1986 rhould rcducc tho drfr:aranct to bttwcan
10:6 and 35*. HorrcvGr th.ro will bo a trtnaltlonal P.rrodt untll 3l fr.ca&.!
LgAz S% to 5576 and until 31 Dccembcr 1984 ?.5:6 to 42.5%. ltre Commirelou
har ruggcttcd 2Of ae poeribly thc ultinetc ldeal ratlo'
3. Ztrc longth of th6 staE€! and tho extent of the rchnowladged dlf,fot.{rcaa
point to thc great divcrgencc ln thc narltctr. fhis pfotlen and alao nttrfr
such ae the critcrlon for haruonieation (ratio of th. sPecific to th!
proportional corqrcnent lnst€ad of, for ocra^uple, tho tatiff itself) r thl
poselbllity of cxcluding culto[!8 duttar frm tho baalt for caleulatingr th.
proportional clousnt of rxclrc dutyr flxtng thr rntnimrm exclac duty andl
harmonlzation of th. nethod of lrvylng oxclm duty eomc wlthln the t3ln. o!
rGforcnc. of thc coErlttao rtrponrtblc end rro therafora net oovtrod hcla.
4. Th6 Cornltt.. on Dudg.tr frelr bound to'totnt out, hrnrrav.r, thnt tha
Cmrlrrlon'r ctleulatlonr pr.ruppo.. an axtrcrnely stttlc tltuetl.(m. t{hrn
calculatlng the .ffect of tax ltructurot on retail pricee r constlnt llfnlnt
of tax for eigarottes ln the moat PoPtllar price category l,r aelUmed. In
the cvaluation of the conl3quencer of th€ proposed diractlvt on thg Frgnch
market it ir algo assumcd that ta't I]ew iluret remain conctlnt and thlt
th€rcfore the retall prlce of the most popular cigarotte rill incrsatt by
Z%. For the Itatian market the aseunption is sxtcndGd to cov€r a static
producer and retail Priee.
-$-
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Eh. Coulttcc olr Agriorltfrrc herrby cubmits to thc Committee 
on
Economie and uonetary Affalre 3nd to the European Parliatent 
the folloruing
rocndmntr to the 'Dtotton for a Rclolution:
D.l.t. Paragre$r 2'
Adat thc follalng n'r Flrrgraibrr
2a.Bcltcvcrth.tth€lalcabtlltyofclgar€tt€sandtobaceodependaac
[rGh roll vrrletlonr In taptg as on differential variationc 
ln price
and that tt lr thor.torc xrong to E).nalize the tastes of 
particurar
eonrurlrc ln an rffort to comP€l them to changc to clgarettca 
which
thty do not tlnd gcc'Ptable
12.InvlgcetteeommtieldttostlcngthenmatureEtoencorrageCommunity
tobaccoproducerltoEto,thorevarictiesrequlredbytheCommunity
mrkct'
,i
$rttlfleatlon
1. the counLtlionrr propolal 1g thc thlrd atagc of, the 
htrrnonization of
oxelradutyl.vlGdonclgarcttoe.UnderCorncllDirectiveT2/464/gEcof
DGc.nber 1972, rhlch launchad thG flr't sttgG' harmonlzation 
ie to ba
achlcvedbyflxlngthGrltlob.6,€tntwotaxcomPonsntl:afixedarnount
prr clEarettc (rrpocLtlc coop,oncnt.) and a varlablc amount proportional
to thc currGnt rrtall prf,ce ('ad valoren')' Dlring the firet stage 
endlng
on30firnGlgTTlthoepcbtftrecoBPon.ntsaStobebrorghtuithinabracket
of botrrrn 5?6 qnd ?516 of'thl total exclrc duty lcvled on 
cigarettca'
ercludlng 1IAT. hrrtng thc lceond ttagc' whlch canp into 
effect on
1iN1y19?EandhalbcancxtondodtoJtrnelgEl,ltmr8tbebrotrglrtuithirr
a brlctet of b€W..n 5?6 and 55* lncludlng VAT' During the 
third stage'
uhtch-undrr th. tGrm. of th. propoeel muet bc complcted on 31 
Deceurloer 1986'
ltrtllhll,ttoblbrorrlhtrlthlnabrlckctofbotween10?6and35%.
2,lriohberstrt..lnthrcoulunttyercdlvidcdintotwonaingrouPsfortobaceo
tl*purSroecclt,hotgtroduelnghlghquallty,,highcrpricedelgarettceforwhom
arpcclflctlxlt,-th.rlf,qremor.aPProprtateandthoaeproducingcheeper
vrrlgtlcaUhoh.vchietorielllyprefcrredantdvllolemtax.Cornmiesion
flguretlhdr,thtttlvctltcubrrstrtes(theBeneluxcountrlea,Franc€andltlly)
,il
,.r'i, i
i.,,l'b,'{'* s
,r"Jf' 
-
,.,rrt J .. '; i'.r.
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rPPly tPeeific cooPon€nt. Glo'G to th. ruthori'.d ulninum of, 5,1"i three more l
(unitcd Klngdom, 
,Drntnrk end lralend) tF,Ply a apacific eonponent close to the
authorlzrd atrlnun of 55* r'ttll. thc Pederll RePubllc of Germeny hag reduced ltt
epcclficcomPonentfrora5lg6to40*oftoteltax.AProee3sofharmonization
derlgncd to estlbllgh a flxcd end unlforn reletlonshlp bctnen the ttdo coltponentB
rcprrr.ntr a,thrart to thc,lntcrorts o'h cactr group, tftrich Gxtltint why progreaa
ha6 baan lo e1or. I
3. Ehe cOnrnltelon hac strt€d thet the only poeelble baais of harmonization
should be ,a proccss of broadly'tqusl efforts of edaptaElon by Member states''
But in fact this has not been the.c!!6. sincc the firgt stage of harrnonization
tlcmber sttt€s hiatorisrlly levying e:rciee duty through ad valorem tax htve only
hed to eec€pt a spcclflc ttx clGDant df 5% wherers those prcferrlng speclfic
tlx havc hld to lecaPt rn ed vtloren .Icn€nt of 45-5q,,,' In addttipn the united
KinEdom and lrrlllld., ntrcro boforc lccrseion cxclte duty had'for a eentury been
baacd on thc ucfght o! thc lce.f, tobrcCo uacd ln n:nufacturing' werc compelled
to rcve to rPcciflg tU( undcr thc Dl.rectivr ;raaccd e fortnight bcforc they
Joincd. lflrcrs.dpvclolnrntt hevG lnvolved thom Ln an effort. bf adjuatnent not
matched an1nfrcrc. in thl,Couunity'
4. The multlpllbr effcct of an ad vrlorcn trx epplied to high quality cigerettae
hee undorlre6le roelar rnd oconouic contcqucnco. Not only does the ttx increaas
with tho iflcc, but it aleb rcduccl uhan Lhe prlcc rcduc€+ thue givlng Eanu-
facturoralnlncgntiveto.nglgcinlprtcecuttlngwar.Thielesgenathelr
abllity to olfcr conlumer! wldot eholcca of product within a given price tanqe'
At valorcm ttx !Iro penallzCs cxpcndlturc On lcl'cntific reecerch and devclop-
m6nt erltlng out of ths publle concarn about tha problam of sDoking and health'
Rsductlons in price lnd quality un6cr the lnflusnce of a high ad valoren tax
could rllo rGduee the abtlity of conuunity clgarcttea to eomPctc with hlgher
gualityProductsontheworldlDlrket.Ftnally,thercductionofttxyield
whlchfollowaprieceuttinEeouldeompelgovcrnmentstointerv.n€tocheck
thta losg of rcvcnuc by ltxtng prlcrL, contrrry to the princlplre of hlrrnonlz-
etlon rnd frea compotlElur. It te atgnlflcrnt thrt countrieg rlth th' hlghrat
ad vllorao ttx get ttrc ldmat tex ylrld bceeurc mlnufeeturers roduce both
qualtty and prl'cc in oltcr to co'E ti
I
i
,t ,,,ri-r',.,.n; 
11.,1F,, e jlt'
'l'$*;,, 
,.:,,r."
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c). the Commiagion .adnits thlt the dcAree of narket inter-penetratiorr produced
by hrrmonizltion has to, fer not bcen great. This is because the saleabilitT
of, cigarcttca dcpcnd! nor€ on'varirtions in taste than in prict. AIso the
sxletcned of !t!EG nonopol!.ce in France end ltaly, giving their governments
complctt control over priceg, lnd the cloaa government supervision of prices
in thp Bcnelrrx countrLcl, har dogc mor€ to dietort eompetition than tax
diffarcncce havc done. triorcovetr thcre are llrge differences in the overall
lavel of cigercttr taxation in l-icnbcr State!, the level in the Menber St,ate
with the highcst tlxation bcing aix timcr ts Ereet aB that in the llember stare
with the lorrcrt lcvel. It is not to be oxpected that Menber states wi}l be
willing to give up the freedmr to im;rcre thc lsvels of tax that most eult their
gocial policiee.
6. fhe thlrd rtlge of hrrnonlzetion nolr proposed would mean a further unegual
rdJuatoant in trx, thc countrler prcforring epecific tax having to reduce
thit olsment to 35* whilc countricc prefcrring ad valorem tax would merely
hrv€ to move ftom 5% epcctflc tax to 106. Ttre Comrniseion justlfiee this as
en lntcrim step towerdr ltg finrl gorl of a 2a* compon€nt of spccific t,ax.
Sueh e conponcnt, it argucs', rcPratcnt! the erithnetic ncen of the price
chrnEtEs whieh woutd rcrult,f,rom eIL l{rnbor Stetce tdopting the two extremes
of lpdclfic tex olcmtnt flxcd for tho eccond stage, 5% to 55*, and therefore
r€pr.r.nts a 'brordly tqutl.effort of edaptation'by ltlcnbcr St.tc8 in the two
groupr. Not only doee thl! ncthod of calculation make no lttcmPt to determine
thc optlmun trx rtrueturG lor Ehc Coonunlty, but it has bcen chellcngad as
fallaclout. For exenlrlG, Lt astumcr that tax changes do not affect the level
of tex txclurlvc prlce., wb€r.ar e high ed valorem tex cln be chorn to have
guch an effact.
,; A dor€ lnpdrtent crittcien tlcc ln thc fact th.t lccount is not ttken af
Gba rjor inpttcdttoni bf their ProPo.rl upon tha mrket. A very high
ad vrlorcn el'cncnt enpllflca any eut or increase in pricca to an extreme
degrce; the governnGnt in fact through locg of rcvcnu. rubrldlzca ruch
prica cute. 1'hta cxaggcnted tnprct on prices (or the rnultiplier effect)
lncvltably leedc to dcatebilization of the market tnd a reaction by national
trcaeurl,cg unhrppy et loce of r.vGnu.. I{herevcr a high ad valorem element
haa becn rppllcd, govsrnmentr hivc cntered to tPply price eontrols, leading
incvltably to dlatortton ln eorhtrGtltton end in dircqt contrediction to
beelc conccPtl underlylng thc Treaty.
8. Morlover, Conmunity cigerettc ;troduccra thould be able to compete in
thc world tharkQt, and any ayltcm, ruch as a hlgh ad velorcm tex, which
nltigatee rglinlt thc productlon of tho high quelity ciglrcttca is not to
be wclcomed'.
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g. During the second stage bf ha'rrhonlzttion the Economic and soclel committee
Ln Eueaelr proposed an alternativc method of harmonization based on the extent
to which proportiontl taxetion increared retail selling prieee and asked for
aninquirybuttheConnlagionrejectedthlaasinconpatlblewith
Dlroctivc 72/464/EiW,. llhlt the Cmuierion ignoreg, hcrvrGver, is that its ot^'n
propoaal for lncrcaeing tha ad velorem clcmcnt lo 65% and eventually 80/" is
lncompatlble vlth Arttclc 3 of the'Treaty which calls for the |linination of
distortions of eomPetitlon. Such flguree would Produce multipliers exceeding
two and eventually rn everage multiplier of threc, which would severely disEort
conrpetition. Dlogt concuEer Productg bear a mutrtiPlier as a re8ult of the ad
valorem elements of vAT and distributive margin6, but- in most cases it is
lround 1.5 0r lcea. The commiseion itself has criticiz€d levels of indirect
taxetion on articlcg of mass consuuption which produce a multiplier of two
and haa done ao on the groundo that high multipliers dietort conpetitsion'
It is thercfor€ ironlc thrt it should lteelf be propocing high multipliers
in thc calG of tobaeco. If harnonizrtion ig to be aehieved on the bagis of
a ratio betrrcen thc two comPonents, thc multitrrlier effect should not exceed
L.?, uhlch glvce r ,lP€cif lc cmPon.nt of around the prelent level of 5096'
A ratio ol 5o/5o apdcific en6,td vllorem would therefore be the one which
aceord.moetclogctywtththcbeslceipofthecdnmunlty,ensuringthat
conpetition ia not diltort'd' sct out ln Artlcle 3'
Iq. f move from tha preaant apeciflc comPonent of 5% to 50,6 would cause
gravedifflcultledforcertaln}lemberstltes.Ifitweretobeproceeded
with,thGrefore,'longperiodofderogationwouldbcrequircdtoengble
thcproducercoflovcrpricedtoblcco,notablyinFrancctndltlly,toadjuat
to the new situation. At Present, degPite cAP expenditufe on supPort for
tobaeco grcrrcrE runnlng tt 21O uilllon units of aeeount in 1978' the Comnunity
still;rroduccrveryllttl€tob.ccointhegred€Bandvarletieeneededinthe
north Europcln nerkcts and there ia surplua production of some varietiee ' 
'
auch rB oricntar. tobacc6, which vlll be exaeerbated forlowing the accession
of Grege€, whieh ie a lerge ProArctr of Oriental' fhege dif,ficulties should
be rccognizcd by changca in the tlpe of CAP suPPort 60 aB to encourege
farmers Eo novs tourrd! the production of the qualitiea and varieties the
market necds. the introduetlon of ! comnon merket organization for tobacco
ln I9?O wac intcndcd to enable toblcco tax harmonization to be dealt utith on
itc oqrn merits and lt would be quite wrong 'for the failure of the CAP system
ofeupporttocncouragcthegrorrthoftherighttyPesoftobaceotobeueed
!! a relron tor hernonizing tax on a bagia which proteete the produeer of
lorrergrldclandpenall'eathecongumerofhigherqullityimportedvarietieg.
Th€lc eonlu[€rr alreedy crrry the burden of en inport lcvy on the tobtceos
rrhich hlvG to bc lmportcd'bccauee th€y trs not grown ln the community' whereas
conlun€r! of, loxrlr quelity varieties mede of indigenoue tobleco are aperad
euehalew.fhcdenandnoUb€lngprcsaedbythegrofl€r!fortheimposition
il
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of a suPPlementary Comrnunity exciee duty on the guantit,y of imported tobacco
in cigaretteg should be regieted as not only would this discriminate againat
developing countries (from whom most of the Flue Cured Virginia Type.t,obaceo
used in certain Member States eomea), but ageingt the conaumera who irefer
the varieties which the Cooarunity itself does not_.grow.
11. shourd a 5o/5o retio bethreen epccific and ad vlroren tax not prove
aecepteble, the Commisgion ghould bs asked to conduet an inquiry into the
whole eystem of harmonization thtough a fixed ratio with a view to finding
alternative rrrays of equaliaing competition.
12. It should be noted that the viewg expressed above
draftsman and are only partly shared by the Comruittee
a whole. It did not agree with the draftsman on the
which she had included in her draft opinion:
are those of the
on Agrieulture ag
folloring points.
' - Notc! that the stages of harmonlzation which have so far taken place have
not aignificantly increased the inter-penetration of markets, and that
one of the greatest obatacles to freer competition in tobacco products
among Member states lies in the continuing existence of state tobaceo
marketing monopolics eontrary to the objectives of the Treaty of Rone;
- Believes that the establlshment of a fixed rela tionehip betueen thc
speeific and proportional erements in tobacco tax is not the most
ef Fective way of ensuring fairer eompctition in the commrnity, but
berieves, if harmonization on this basis is to be pursued, that an
equitable division between ad valorem an5 specitic tax uould be elose
to a 50-50 division so as to reconcile the intereets of the tuo major
groups of manufeeturers in the Comm.rnity;
- Requests the eommission therefore to revise its proposal so as to at161^r
for a more comprehensive approach to the problem of facilitating trade
in the cigarette seetor, and.to suspend any further proposars for tax
harmonization until other bafriers to the inter-penetration of rnarkete,
notably the exiatence of state tobacco monopolies, hav€ been removed. r
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